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On the Unicity Distance of Stego Key
Weiming Zhang, and Shiqu Li
Abstract— Steganography is about how to send secret message covertly.
And the purpose of steganalysis is to not only detect the existence of the
hidden message but also extract it. So far there have been many reliable
detecting methods on various steganographic algorithms, while there are
few approaches that can extract the hidden information. In this paper,
the difficulty of extracting hidden information, which is essentially a
kind of privacy, is analyzed with information-theoretic method in the
terms of unicity distance of steganographic key (abbreviated stego key).
A lower bound for the unicity distance is obtained, which shows the
relations between key rate, message rate, hiding capacity and difficulty of
extraction. Furthermore the extracting attack to steganography is viewed
as a special kind of cryptanalysis, and an effective method on recovering
the stego key of popular LSB replacing steganography in spatial images
is presented by combining the detecting technique of steganalysis and
correlation attack of cryptanalysis together. The analysis for this method
and experimental results on steganographic software “Hide and Seek
4.1” are both accordant with the information-theoretic conclusion.
Index Terms— cryptanalysis, steganalysis, unicity distance, extracting
attack, correlation attack, “Hide and Seek 4.1”.
I. INTRODUCTION
Steganography is an important branch of information hiding, and
it is about how to send secret message covertly. The attacks to
steganography (i.e. steganalysis) mainly include passive attack, active
attack, and extracting attack. A passive attacker only wants to detect
the existence of the embedded message, while an active attacker
wants to destroy it. The purpose of an extracting attacker is to obtain
the message embedded into the innocent data. So there are three
kinds of security for different attacks respectively, i.e. detectability,
robustness and difficulty of extraction.
The theoretic study about steganography has always been concern-
ing the detectability, and there have been many literatures that model
the detectability with information-theoretic method or in the terms of
computational complexity [1]–[4]. On the other hand, references [5]–
[7] think of the information hiding problem with active attackers as a
“capacity game”, and define the robustness using the “hiding capcity”.
Although robustness is mainly concerned in watermarking problem,
it, as the measure of efficiency, is also important for steganography.
And references [8]–[11] analyze the relation between the detectability
and robustness.
Similar with the theoretic field, the study about actual steganalysis
has also being centering on detecting technique. And there have been
many detecting methods for a variety of steganographic algorithms
such as [12]–[14]. However, there are only a few papers about
extracting attack. Chandramouli [15] studies how to make extracting
attack on spread spectrum steganography for a special scenario in
which the same message is sent twice in the same image with
different strength factors. Fridrich et al. [16] show how to get the
hidden message through recovering the key of LSB steganography
on JPEG images such as “F5 [17] and Outguess [18]”. And recently
in [19] Fridrich et al. extent their approach to spatial domain.
Another extracting approach to LSB steganography on JPEG images
is presented by Ma et al. [20].
The extracting attack on steganography can be viewed as a special
kind of cryptanalysis. In fact for most of steganographic systems the
message is required to be encrypted before it is hidden. Therefore,
when facing the model of ”encrytion+hiding”, a cryptanalyst has
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to analyze a “multiple cipher”. Fridrich et al. [16] analyze the
complexity of searching stego-key: If there is some recognizable
structure in the steganographic communication, one can use it as a
sign to searching the key by dictionary attack or brute-force search;
otherwise, searching process should try all encryption keys for every
possible stego-key, so the complexity of brute-force search becomes
proportional to the product of the number of stego and crypto keys.
That means that the extraction and decipher should be done together.
Obviously a cryptanalyst hope that the two tasks can be finished
independently. And the extracting attack just solve the problem
how to extract the embedded sequence without regard to encryption
algorithm.
In this paper, the difficulty of extraction, which is essentially a kind
of privacy, is studied with information-theoretic method in the terms
of unicity distance of stego key. Unicity distance is just the minimum
number of data needed by the attacker to recover the stego key, which
can exactly grasp the concept on “difficulty of extraction” for key
based stegonography. The relations between key rate, message rate,
hiding capacity and unicity distance are analyzed. And it is proved
that unicity distance is directly proportional to the entropy of stego-
key, and inversely proportional to “hiding redundancy” which is the
difference between the hiding capacity and message rate.
As mentioned above, our conclusion comes from the basic idea that
extracting attack on steganography is a special kind of steganalysis.
Therefore this problem can be solved by combining traditional
techniques of cryptanalysis and steganalysis together. As an exam-
ple, we present an extracting approach on random LSB replacing
steganography of spatial images, which is based on some detecting
techniques in steganalysis and the idea of correlation attack [21] in
cryptanalysis. One contribution of our attack is that it can accurately
estimate the amount of necessary data. With this method, we make
a successful extracting attack on steganographic software “Hide and
Seek 4.1” [22] which is found in the United States recently [23].
Experimental results on “Hide and Seek 4.1” are accordant with the
analysis for our extracting algorithm, which also verify the validity
of the information-theoretic conclusion.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The main theorem
on unicity distance of stego key is given in Sect. II. And in Sect.
III a method of recovering stego key – “correlation attack” – on
LSB replacing steganography of spatial images is presented. The
experimental results on attacking “Hide and Seek 4.1” is given in
Sect. IV. And the paper concludes with a discussion in Sect. V.
II. INFORMATION-THEORETIC ANALYSIS FOR THE UNICITY
DISTANCE OF STEGO KEY
A. Notations and Definitions
For the information-theoretic analysis, we use the following no-
tations. Random variables are denoted by capital letters (e.g. X),
and their realizations by respective lower case letters (e.g. x). The
domains over that random variables are defined are denoted by script
letters (e.g. X ). Sequences of N random variables are denoted with a
superscript (e.g. XN = (X1, X2, · · · , XN ) which takes its values on
the product set XN ). And we denote entropy and conditional entropy
with H(·) and H(·|·) respectively.
A general model of a stegosystem can be described as follows.
The embedded data M is hidden in an innocuous data X˜ , usually
named cover object, in the control of a secret stego key K, producing
the stego object X . The stego key is shared between the sender and
receiver but is secret for the third party. And the receiver can extract
M from X with the stego key K. An extracting attacker wants to
recover the embedded message or the stego key through the stego
object (Maybe he can use some side information, for example part
knowledge about the cover object).
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Assume that the cover object data is a sequence X˜N =
(X˜1, X˜2, · · · , X˜N ) of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d)
samples from P (x˜). Because the embedded message usually is cipher
text, we assume that it is a sequence MN = (M1,M2, · · · ,MN ) of
independent and uniformly distributed, and independent of X˜N . The
stego key K is independent of the message and cover object.
Now we describe a formal definition of steganographic code which
is introduced by Moulin et al. [7], [24]. First of all, the embedding
algorithm of a stegosystem should keep transparency that can be
guaranteed by some distortion constraint. A distortion function is a
nonnegative function d : X×X → R+∪{0}, which can be extended
to one on N-tuples by d(xN , yN) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
d(xi, yi).
Definition 1: [7] A length-N steganographic code subject to dis-
tortion D is a triple (M, fN , φN ), where
• M is the message set of cardinality |M|;
• fN : XN × M × K → XN is the embedding algorithm
mapping a sequence x˜N , a message m and a key k to a sequence
xN = fN (x˜
N , m, k). This mapping is subject to the distortion
constraint ∑
x˜N∈XN
∑
k∈K
∑
m∈M
1
|M| · |K|P (x˜
N)
· d(x˜N , fN (x˜N ,m, k)) ≤ D ;
• φN : XN × KN → M is the extracting algorithm mapping
the received sequence xN with the key k to a decoded message
m̂ = φN (x
N , k).
A cover channel is a conditional p.m.f. (probability mass function)
q(x|x˜) : X → X . The compound cover channel subject to distortion
D is the set
Q = {q(x|x˜) :
∑
x˜,x
d(x˜, x)q(x|x˜)P (x) ≤ D} .
The length-N memoryless extension of the channel is the conditional
p.m.f.
q(xN |x˜N ) =
N∏
i=1
q(xi|x˜i), ∀N ≥ 1 .
For a length-N steganographic code, define the message rate and key
rate as
Rm =
H(M)
N
, Rk =
H(K)
N
respectively. And define the probability of error as PeN =
P (φN(X
N ,K) 6= M). The hiding capacity is the supremum of all
achieve message rates of steganographic codes subject to distortion
D under the condition of zero probability of error (i.e. Pe,N →
0 as N →∞).
Because we disregard the active attacker and assume that K is
independent of M and X˜ , the results of [7], [24] imply that the
expression of hiding capacity for steganographic code can be given
by
C(D) = max
q(x|x˜)∈Q
H(X|X˜) . (1)
Because C(D) is the maximum of the conditional entropy through
all cover channels subject to D distortion, C(D) just reflects the
hiding ability of the cover-object within the distortion constraint. So
we refer to C(D)−Rm as the hiding redundancy, which can reflect
the hiding capability of the steganographic code.
B. Unicity Distance of Stego-key
According to the Kerckhoff’s principle, the security of a stegano-
graphic code should be based on nothing but the secrecy of the stego
key. Therefore, it is important to analyze the key equivocation. In
details, we want to know how many data the attacker must used
to recover the stego key, i.e. the unicity distance of stego key. We
analyze this problem according to two kinds of attacking conditions.
One is stego-only extracting attack, i.e. the attacker can only get the
stego objects; the other is known-cover extracting attack that means
that the attacker can get not only the stego objects but also some
corresponding cover objects. And we begin the analysis with known-
cover attack.
Theorem 1: (M, fN , φN ) is length-N steganographic code sub-
ject to distortion D with zero probability of error, i.e. for any given
ε > 0, PeN = P (φN(X
N ,K) 6=M) ≤ ε. Then for given sequence
of n (n is large enough) pairs of cover objects and stego objects, the
expectation of spurious stego keys Sn for known-cover extracting
attack has the lower bound such that
Sn ≥ 2
H(K)
2nN(C(D)−Rm+ε)
− 1 ,
where C(D) = max
q(x|x˜)∈Q
H(X|X˜) is the hiding capacity and Rm =
H(M)
N
is the message rate.
Proof: For a given sequence of pairs of cover objects and stego
objects (x˜N , xN)n, the set of possible stego keys is defined as
K((x˜N , xN)n) = {k ∈ K|∃mn ∈Mn such that
P (mn) > 0 and fnN (x˜Nn,mn, k) = xNn}
where
f
n
N (x˜
Nn
,m
n
, k)
= (fN(x˜
N
1 ,m1, k), · · · , fN(x˜Nn ,mn, k))
= (xN1 , · · · , xNn ) = xNn
So the number of spurious stego keys for observed (x˜N , xN )n is∣∣K((x˜N , xN)n)∣∣ − 1, and the expectation of spurious stego keys is
given by
Sn =
∑
(x˜N ,xN )n
P ((x˜N , xN)n)
[∣∣∣K((x˜N , xN)n)∣∣∣− 1]
=
∑
(x˜N ,xN )n
P ((x˜N , xN)n)
∣∣∣K((x˜N , xN)n)∣∣∣− 1 .
Using Jesen’s inequality, we can get
H(K|X˜Nn, XNn)
=
∑
(x˜N ,xN )n
P ((x˜N , xN)n)H(K| (x˜N , xN)n)
≤
∑
(x˜N ,xN )n
P ((x˜N , xN)n) log2
∣∣∣K((x˜N , xN)n)∣∣∣
≤ log2
∑
(x˜N ,xN )n
P ((x˜N , xN)n)
∣∣∣K((x˜N , xN)n)∣∣∣
= log2(Sn + 1) . (2)
On the other hand, fnN(x˜Nn,mn, k) = xNn implies
H(XNn|X˜Nn,Mn,K) = 0, which, together with the assumption
that key is independent of message and cover object, message is
independent of cover object, and the sequences X˜Nn and Mn are
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both i.i.d. sequence of random variables, yields that
H(X˜Nn, XNn,Mn,K)
= H(XNn|X˜Nn,Mn,K) +H(X˜Nn,Mn,K)
= H(X˜Nn,Mn) +H(K)
= NnH(X˜) + nH(M) +H(K) . (3)
Since the steganographic code satisfies zero probability of error, we
have, for any given ε > 0,
P (φnN(X
Nn
,K) 6=Mn)
= P ((φN(X
N
1 ,K), · · · , φN (XNn ,K) 6= (M1, · · ·Mn))
= P (∃ i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n and φN(XNi ,K) 6=Mi)
≤
n∑
i=1
P (φN(X
N
i , K) 6=Mi)
≤ nε . (4)
Equation (4) with Fano’s inequality implies that for any given ε > 0,
H(Mn|XNn,K) ≤ nε (5)
Furthermore, because sequence X˜Nn is i.i.d. sequence of random
variables and cover channel is memoryless, we obtain that
H(X˜Nn, XNn,Mn,K)
= H(X˜Nn) +H(XNn|X˜Nn) +H(K|X˜Nn, XNn)
+H(Mn|X˜Nn, XNn,K)
≤ NnH(X˜) +NnH(X|X˜) +H(K|X˜Nn, XNn)
+H(Mn|XNn,K)
≤ NnH(X˜) +NnH(X|X˜) +H(K|X˜Nn, XNn) + nε.(6)
combining (3) and (6) yields that, for any given ε > 0,
H(K|X˜Nn, XNn) ≥ H(K)+nH(M)−NnH(X|X˜)−nε , (7)
which, together with (2), implies for any given ε > 0,
log2(Sn + 1) ≥ H(K) + nH(M)−NnH(X|X˜)− nε ,
i.e.
Sn ≥ 2
H(K)
2n(NH(X|X˜)−H(M)+ε)
− 1 . (8)
Since hiding capacity C(D) satisfies C(D) = max
q(x|x˜)∈Q
H(X|X˜) and
Rm =
H(M)
N
, we have, for any given ε > 0,
Sn ≥ 2
H(K)
2nN(C(D)−Rm+ε)
− 1 .
Definition 2: The unicity distance n0 for a steganographic code
with known-cover extracting attackers is the minimum number of
pairs of cover objects and stego objects with which one expects that
the expectation of spurious stego keys equals zero. And the unicity
distance n1 for a steganographic code with stego-only extracting
attackers is the minimum number of stego objects with which one
expects that the expectation of spurious stego keys equals zero.
It is easy to know that n1 ≥ n0 . And using Theorem 1, we can
get the following important corollary.
Corollary 2: The unicity distance n0 for known-cover extracting
attack and n1 for stego-only extracting attack satisfy that for any
given ε > 0,
n1 ≥ n0 ≥ Rk
C(D) −Rm + ε ,
where C(D) = max
q(x|x˜)∈Q
H(X|X˜) is the hiding capacity, Rm =
H(M)
N
is the message rate and Rk = H(K)N is the key rate.
Corollary 2 shows that larger key rate Rk and smaller hiding
redundancy C(D) −Rm can make stronger difficulty of extraction.
The former is clear, while, for the latter, we give an intuitive
explanation as follows. Smaller hiding redundancy means a message
rate more appropriate for the cover channel. In this case, dealing with
the stego-objects (such as sampling) with correct and spurious key
respectively can only bring small differences. In other words, it is
difficult for the extracting attacker to distinguish between the correct
key and spurious ones.
C. The Analysis for LSB Steganography
As an example, we use the results in preceding subsection to
analyze the most popular steganographic mechanism, i.e. random
LSB steganoraphy on images, such as F5 [17], Outguess [18] and
“Hide and Seek” [22].
LSB replacing steganography usually work in the following man-
ner: Firstly, select an image with N DCT coefficients for JPEG im-
ages (or N pixels for spatial images) denoted by C = (c1, · · · , cN ).
Then randomly pick a subset of pixels, {cj1 , · · · , cjL}, using a
Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) which is seeded with
a stego-key k belonging to the key space K, i.e. the PRNG with
k generates a embedding path {j1, · · · , jL}. Finally, embedding the
message sequence M = (m1, · · · , mL), where mi ∈ {0, 1}, by
replacing the LSBs of {cj1 , · · · , cjL} or other embedding operations
such as ±1 to the DCT coefficients (or pixels), and generate the stego-
image S = (s1, · · · , sN). Two kinds of embedding operations are
shown in Table I and Table II respectively.
TABLE I
LSB REPLACING EMBEDDING OPERATION
Sample value 2i 2i+1
Embedded message bit 0 1 0 1
Modified sample value 2i 2i+1 2i 2i+1
TABLE II
±1 EMBEDDING OPERATION
Sample value 2i 2i+1
Embedded message bit 0 1 0 1
Modified sample value 2i 2i+1 or 2i-1 2i or 2i+2 2i+1
The embedding rate r is defined as the ratio of the length of
message to that of image, i.e. r = L
N
. which means that the possibility
of a DCT coefficient (or pixel) being selected to carry one bit message
is r, because the message is asked to randomly scattered in the whole
image. Since message sequence M is usually cipher text, we assume
that M is uniformly distributed and independent with C, therefore
every pixel is modified with probability r
2
. In fact LSBs of images are
similar to noise data and then approximately is uniformly distributed
and independent with M , so the assumption of modifying rate being
r
2
is also reasonable for plain text M .
When using Corollary 2, we have to compute the hiding capacity
that is hard generally. However, if the cover-objects are binary
sequence satisfying distribution of Bernoulli( 1
2
) and the distortion
metric is Hamming metric, hiding capacity is given in [24]. The
capacity is
C(D) =
{
H(D) if 0 ≤ D ≤ 1
2
1 if D > 1
2
, (9)
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Fig. 1. Hiding redundancy: the curve denotes the “hiding capacity” H
(
r
2
)
,
the beeline stands for the message rate r, and the difference between them is
just the hiding redundancy.
where H(D) = −D log2D − (1−D) log2(1−D).
To analyze the LSB steganography, for simple we take the LSBs
of the DCT coefficients (or pixels) as cover-objects, which satisfies
distribution of Bernoulli( 1
2
) approximatively. And when the the
embedding rate is r (0 ≤ r ≤ 1), message rate is just Rm = LN =
r bits/sign (note that Rm has a unit but embedding rate r has not)
and the Hamming distortion is r
2
. Therefore (9) implies the hiding
capacity is H( r
2
), and the hiding redundancy is H( r
2
)− r.
In Fig.1, it is clear that when r → 0 (or r → 1), the redundancy
of cover channel H
(
r
2
) − r → 0, with which Corollary 2 implies
that the unicity of the stego key tends to infinity, i.e. it is hard for
the attack to succeed.
III. EXTRACTING ATTACK ON LSB REPLACING
STEGANOGRAPHY OF SPATIAL IMAGES
Reference [16] presents an extracting attack on LSB steganography
of JPEG images (such as F5 and Outguess), and [19] make an
extracting attack on LSB (replacing or ±1) steganography of spatial
images. The purposes of these attacks are both to recovery the stego-
key, and the experimental results show the same phenomena that the
attacking processes need more data for small or large embedding rate
r, and when r → 0 (or r → 1) the attacks will fail, which consists
with the information-theoretic conclusion in Sect. II. However, on
the other hand, it should be noted that the analysis in Sect. II is
based on some general assumptions and the lower bound in corollary
2 is obtained from known-cover attack although it is also a lower
bound for stego-only attack. Therefore the results of preceding section
can only reflect the tendency of the difficulty of recovering stego
key but can not be used to estimate the amount of needed data by
the attacker. And the methods of [16] and [19] are both based on
non-parameter hypothesis testing, by which it is hard to calculate
the necessary amount of samples. Now we present a new stego key
searching method for LSB replacing steganography of spatial images
by using a parameter hypothesis testing, which is efficient and simpler
than preceding methods. The main contribution of our attack is that
it can accurately estimate the amount of necessary data, which is
important because with less data we cannot get the stego key while
too much data will slow down the searching speed.
Our method is also an example about how to do extracting attack
by combining traditional techniques of cryptanalysis and steganalysis
together. The main ideas are as follows. Firstly estimate the length
of the message (the embedding rate) with some detecting methods.
And then filter the stego image to get the data of its noise area
that can be thought of as a sample from a mixture distribution [25]
with the mixing parameter as a function of the embedding rate.
Through analyzing this mixture distribution, we can exploit some
“accordant advantage” of the correct stego key over those spurious
ones. Finally, with this accordant advantage, do the correlation attack
as cryptanalysis to obtain the stego key.
We do extracting attack under the assumption that we get a stego
image and know the steganographic algorithm. And the only thing we
don’t know is just the stego key. This assumption is similar with that
in cryptanalysis. And in this paper, 8 bits grayscale images is taken as
examples to describe our method. And the same notations as those in
Sect. II (C) will be used. In details, denote the cover image and stego
image with N pixels by C = (c1, · · · , cN ) and S = (s1, · · · , sN)
respectively, where ci, si ∈ [0, 255] and 1 ≤ i ≤ N . The stego key
k, belonging to the key space K, is just the seed of the PRNG. The
message sequence is denoted by M = (m1, · · · ,mL). Notice that,
as mentioned in Sect. I, message is usually required to be encrypted
before it is embedded into images, which is why recovering stego key
with simple brute-force search has to consider the encryption key at
the same time. And the purpose of our method is to get the stego key
k regardless of encryption key when getting only the stego image S.
A. A mixture distribution model of stego images’ noise
LSB steganography essentially hides the message in the noise area
of the image. Therefore we analyze the noise data of the stego image.
Firstly filter the stego image S = (s1, · · · , sN ) with spatial average
filter, and get a“new image” S¯ = {s¯1, s¯2, · · · , s¯N}. Note that here
save s¯i’s as real numbers, i.e. keep several digits of decimal fraction
when averaging pixels. Then take difference between the pixels of S
and S¯ as the noise data. For 1 ≤ i ≤ N , if si is odd, the noise data
is defined as wi = si − s¯i, and if si is even wi = s¯i − si. The set
of noise data is denoted by W = {w1, w2, · · · , wN}.
It is reasonable to assume that the noise data wi’s corresponding
to si’s, which have not been modified, is a sample from a Gaussian
White Noise approximately, i.e. a normal distribution with mean 0
and variance σ2. And if the pixel si in ith position has been modified
in embedding process, 1 has been added to ci when si is odd, and
1 has been subtract from ci when si is even as shown in Table
I. Therefore wi’s corresponding to modified si’s can be viewed as a
sample from a normal distribution with mean 1 and the same variation
σ2. Here we ignore the influence of modifying pixels around the
position i, because this kind of influence is counteracted by averaging
them. Both of the two assumptions have been verified by experimental
results on many images. When embedding rate is r , in S on average
r
2
of pixels have been modified. So W = {w1, w2, · · · , wN} is a
sample from a mixture distribution
F r
2
(x) = (1− r
2
)F (x) +
r
2
G(x) (10)
where F (x) and G(x) are the distribution functions of normal
distribution N(0, σ2) and N(1, σ2) respectively.
For k ∈ K, let I(k) denote the set of sample indices visited along
the path generated from the key k. If k is a spurious key, {wj}j∈I(k)
is a random sample from distribution (10). On the other hand, if k is
just the correct key k0, in {wj}j∈I(k0) on average 50% of samples
are from distribution F (x) and the other 50% of them from the
distribution G(x). So in this case, {wj}j∈I(k0) is a random sample
from mixture distribution such as
F 1
2
(x) =
1
2
F (x) +
1
2
G(x) . (11)
When 0 < r < 1, the difference between distributions (10) and (11)
can be used to distinguish the correct key from those spurious ones.
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B. Accordant Advantage
To exploit the difference between mixture distributions (10) and
(11), let X0 be a random variable with distribution function F (x), X1
is a random variable with distribution function G(x), α0 = P{X0 >
A}, and α1 = P{X1 > A}, where A is a real number larger than
zero. Then
α0 =
∫ +∞
A
dF (x) =
∫ +∞
A
1√
2piσ
exp
{
− x
2
2σ2
}
dx , (12)
α1 =
∫ +∞
A
dG(x) =
∫ +∞
A
1√
2piσ
exp
{
− (x− 1)
2
2σ2
}
dx . (13)
Write ∆α = α1 − α0. It is easy to be proved that ∆α > 0.
As mentioned above, for the correct key k0, the sample of noise
data set {wj}j∈I(k0) can be modeled as the realizations of a random
variable Y0 whose distribution function is (11), while for an incorrect
key k, sample {wj}j∈I(k) can be viewed as the realizations of a
random variable Y1 whose distribution function is (10). Let p0 =
P (Y0 > A) and p1 = P (Y1 > A), then
p0 =
∫ +∞
A
dF 1
2
(x) =
1
2
α0 +
1
2
α1 , (14)
p1 =
∫ +∞
A
dF r
2
(x) = (1− r
2
)α0 +
r
2
α1 . (15)
And then the difference between them is that
∆p = p0 − p1 = 1
2
(1− r)(α1 − α0) = 1
2
(1− r)∆α . (16)
When the embedding rate r being less than 1, ∆p > 0 because ∆α >
0. That implies the correct key can sample large noise data with
lager possibility than a spurious key does. Call ∆p as the “accordant
advantage”. When ∆p being large enough, we can recover the correct
key. Given the r, ∆p is determined by ∆α, therefore we hope to take
the proper A to get the largest ∆α. Define function
Q(x) =
1√
2pi
∫ +∞
x
exp
{
−y
2
2
}
dy . (17)
Then α0 = Q(Aσ ), α1 = Q(
A−1
σ
), therefore ∆α = Q(A−1
σ
) −
Q(A
σ
). And when A−1
σ
= −A
σ
, i.e. A = 1
2
, ∆α is largest. In this
case,
∆α = Q(− 1
2σ
)−Q( 1
2σ
) = 1− 2Q( 1
2σ
) . (18)
To compute the values of p0 and p1, we need also estimate the
variation σ2. Denote the second moment of sample W as a¯2, i.e.
a¯2 =
1
N
N∑
i=1
w2i . Notice that W is the sample from distribution (10),
therefore the result in [25] implies that a¯2 = (1 − r2 )(
⌢
σ
2
+ 02) +
r
2
(
⌢
σ
2
+ 12), i.e.
⌢
σ
2
= a¯2 − r
2
. (19)
And we take statistic (19) as the estimation of σ2.
C. Correlation Attack
In this section, we borrow the idea of correlation attack in
cryptanalysis to recover the stego key with the accordant advantage
∆p. For k ∈ K the set of indices generated from the key k is denoted
as I(k) = {j1, j2, · · · , jL}. And the corresponding sample from
noise set W obtained with k is {wj1 , wj2 , · · · , wjL} which can be
viewed as a sequence of i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed)
random variables. Define a new sequence of random variables as
Zi =
{
1, if wji > A
0, if wji ≤ A
, 1 ≤ i ≤ L .
Therefore Zi’s are also i.i.d random variables. Construct a sequence
of statistics such as ηn =
n∑
i=1
Zi where 1 ≤ n ≤ L. For the correct
key k0, the analysis in Sect. III (B) shows that P{Zi = 1} = p0 ,
and the Central Limit Theorem implies that the distribution of ηn is
approximately equal to the normal distribution N(np0, np0(1−p0))
when n is large enough. Similarly, on the other hand, for an incorrect
key k, the distribution of ηn is approximately equal to normal
distribution N(np1, np1(1− p1)) when n is large enough. Then the
work of searching the correct key can be formulated as the following
hypothesis testing problem:
H0: ηn ∼ N(np0, np0(1−p0)) which means k is just the correct
key k0;
H1: ηn ∼ N(np1, np1(1 − p1)) which means k is an incorrect
key.
Select a threshold T . If ηn ≥ T , accept H0, otherwise accept H1.
Generally larger number of samples n we use, more accurate de-
cision we can do. However, larger n means spending more searching
time. We should determine n and the threshold T so as to achieve
the proper probability of the false alarm event pf and that of missing
event pm. Using (17), we obtain that
pf = Q
(
T − np1√
np1(1− p1)
)
, pm = Q
(
np0 − T√
np0(1− p0)
)
(20)
In the present problem, we mainly concern pf . When the number of
all possible stego keys is |K|, pf is picked as small as 12|K| so that
the correct key can be determined uniquely. And pm could be chosen
close to zero (for example 10−2). For given pf and pm, search the
Table for Standard Normal Distribution Function to get wf and wm
such that 1
2|K|
= Q(wf ) and pm = Q(wm). Then with (20), we can
compute the needed values of n and T as follows:
n =
[
wm
√
p0(1− p0) + wf
√
p1(1− p1)
∆p
]2
, (21)
T = wf
√
np1(1− p1) + np1 . (22)
Note that to get n samples of noise data, n∗ (n∗ ≈ n
r
) pixels are
needed on average. So combining (16) and (21), we can get an
estimation for the number of needed pixels n∗ such as
n
∗ ≈
4
(
wm
√
p0(1− p0) + wf
√
p1(1− p1)
)2
r[(1− r)∆α]2 . (23)
Equation (23) shows that n∗ → ∞ as r → 0 or 1. In other
words, when the embedding rate r is very small (close to 0) or very
large (close to 1), the process of recovering stego key will become
difficult because we have not enough pixels to use. Notice that this is
accordant with the information-theoretic analysis in Sect.II. And this
conclusion will also be proved by he experimental results on “Hide
and Seek 4.1” in next section.
With preparations above, now we describe the attacking method.
Assume that we have detect a stego image S with N pixels, and
know details of the steganographic algorithm except the stego key.
The attacking procedure goes through the following steps.
Algorithm – Correlation Attack
Step 0 1) Estimate embedded message length L and the em-
bedding rate r (r = L
N
) using the method in [26];
2) Filter the stego image S and take the noise data set
W = {w1, , w2, · · · , wN} as described in Sect. III
(A);
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3) Estimate the variance σ2 with statistic (19). Let A =
0.5, and compute p0 and p1 by using equations (12),
(13), (14) and (15);
4) Let pf = 12|K| , choose a proper pm (for example
10−2), and pick the wf and wm such that 12|K| =
Q(wf ), and pm = Q(wm). Finally compute the
necessary number of samples n and the threshold T
using (21) and (22).
Step 1 If n > L , go to Step 3; otherwise, test all stego keys in
K: for every k ∈ K, seed the PRNG with k to generate the
set containing n sample indices I(k) = {j1, j2, · · · , jn}
and extract n samples of noise data {wj1 , wj2 , · · · , wjn}.
Then count the number Tk of wji ’s such that wji > 0.5,
i.e. Tk = |{wji |wji > 0.5, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}|. If Tk < T ,
reject k, otherwise save k to the set B, i.e. B = {k| k ∈
K and Tk ≥ T}.
Step 2 If |B| = 1, then then take the only key in B as the correct
key and stop; If |B| = 0 or |B| > 1 go to Step 3;
Step 3 Let n = L. Test all keys in K as does in step 1 and
obtain Tk for every k ∈ K. Write Tmax = max
k∈K
{Tk}, and
D = {k| k ∈ K and Tk = Tmax};
Step 4 If |D| = 1, then take the only key in D as the correct key
and stop; If |D| > 1, the attack fails and stop.
IV. EXTRACTING ATTACK ON “HIDE AND SEEK 4.1”
As an example, we use our method to recover the stego key
of ”Hide and Seek 4.1” [22] which is a typical LSB replacing
steganographic algorithm on the GIF file with 256 shades of gray or
color (In fact the deviser of “Hide and Seek” suggest that greyscale
is best by far). The PRNG, used in “Hide and Seek” to generate the
embedding path, is based on the function “random ( )” of “Borland
C++3.1”, which is seeded by a seed of 16 bits and the length of
message together. Hiding program encrypts the header information,
which consists of the 16 bits seed, length of message and number
of version, with IDEA cipher to produce 64 bits cipher texts and
embeds them into the LSBs of the first 64 pixels of the GIF file.
The key of IDEA is generated by a password consisting of not more
than 8 characters (64 bits). Therefore the receiver, who knows the
password, can decipher the hider information to get the seed and
length of message, which will seed the PRNG to extract the hidden
message.
It is hard to recover the 64 bits key of IDEA, but we can skip the
first 64 pixels and recover the key of PRNG with “Correlation Attack”
directly. “Hide and Seek 4.1” uses only GIF images with 320× 480
pixels, so the maximum length of message is defined as 19000 bytes.1
And the approach of [26] can estimate the embedding rate with error
between ±0.02, therefore mostly about 760 (19000× 0.04) possible
lengths need to be tested when searching for the key. In other words,
the cardinality of the key space we search is 216×760, i.e. the length
of virtual key is only about 26 bits (16 + log2 760 ≈ 25.57).
We do the experiment on 40 GIF files with 256-greyscale for
several kinds of embedding rates. And the correct key can be
determined when embedding rate r satisfies 5.3% < r < 94.7%.
However, because the image used by “Hide and Seek” is small (only
320 × 480 pixels), for |K| = 216 × 760, the number of needed
samples n usually is larger than L, the algorithm has to do the Step
3. To test the estimations for n and T with (21) and (22), we also
do the experiment under the assumption that the length of message
being known, which means the key is only the 16 bits of seed. In
this case, for r such that 1.1% < r < 98.4%, we can get the correct
1In “Hide and Seek”,when used as a part of key, the unit of message’s
length is byte.
key successfully. Plain text and cipher text are embedded respectively
with “Hide and Seek 4.1” for the experiments and the attacking results
are similar. These Experiments are achieved on Pentium IV machines
running at 2.4GHz, 512MB RAM, and there is a search rate of 250-
8400 keys per second. The search speed is greatly influenced by the
embedding rate.
The detailed results of experiments on lena.gif and peppers.gif,
when key is only the 16 bits of seed, list Table III and Table
IV respectively. In the tables, “-” means that estimated number of
samples n is larger than the length of message L, and the attack will
do Step 3; Tk0 with “*” is smaller than threshold T and |B| is zero,
therefore the attack also will do the Step 3. It is shown that, when r
satisfying 10.5% < r < 52.6% (i.e. 200 ≤ L ≤ 9000), the necessary
number of samples n is smaller than the length of message L, and
the attacking procedure can stop successfully in step 2. In this case,
there is searching speed increase of 10%− 45% than that of setting
n = L directly, and note that the Tk0 is larger than but close to the
threshold T , which implies that the necessary number of samples n
and the threshold T obtained with (21) and (22) are accurate.
And on the whole the attacking processes need more data for
smaller or larger embedding rate r, and when r → 0 (or r → 1)
attacks will fail, which verifies the information-theoretic conclusion
in Sect. II once more.
Fig. 2. lena.gif Fig. 3. peppers.gif
V. CONCLUSION
In the field of steganalysis, so far there have been many literatures
about detecting attack while there are few about extracting attack.
But the latter also will be concerned greatly because it is a problem
that a cryptanalyst has to face. In this paper, we make a preliminary
analysis on this problem using information-theoretic method that is
an analogue of Shannon’s for cryptography [27]. And the results can
give some general idea about the extracting attack no steganogrphy.
Our basic idea is that the extracting attack is in principle a
kind of cryptanalysis, and it should rely on both steganalysis and
cryptanalysis. As an example, we present an effective extracting
method no popular LSB replacing steganography of spatial images by
using the detecting technique of steganalysis and correlation attacking
technique of cryptanalysis together. The analysis for our extracting
method and the experimental results on “Hide and Seek 4.1” are both
accordant with the information-theoretic conclusion.
Better lower bounds on unicity of stego key for stgeo-only attack
and attacks under other conditions are interesting problems that
we will study. And our further work will also include exploiting
extracting approaches on other kinds of steganographic algorithms.
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TABLE III
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ON LENA.GIF
Length of Embedding rate Number of Threshold T Tk0 corresponding Result of attack
message L (bytes) r samples n (bytes) to the correct key k0
100 0.005 – – – Fail
200 0.011 – – – Succeed
1000 0.053 – – – Succeed
2000 0.105 1830 6925 7086 Succeed
3000 0.158 2066 7845 8040 Succeed
5000 0.263 2699 10319 10466 Succeed
8000 0.421 4374 16888 16922 Succeed
9000 0.474 5293 20503 20560 Succeed
10000 0.526 6535 24086 25398 Succeed
12000 0.632 10805 41954 42265 Succeed
13000 0.684 – – – Succeed
18700 0.984 – – – Succeed
18800 0.989 – – – Fail
TABLE IV
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ON PEPPERS.GIF
Length of Embedding rate Number of Threshold T Tk0 corresponding Result of attack
message L (bytes) r samples n (bytes) to the correct key k0
50 0.003 – – – Fail
100 0.005 – – – Succeed
200 0.011 – – – Succeed
1000 0.053 – – – Succeed
2000 0.105 1301 4874 5008 Succeed
3000 0.158 1470 5527 5669 Succeed
5000 0.263 1921 7341 7982 Succeed
8000 0.421 3111 11894 11933 Succeed
9000 0.474 3764 14368 14493 Succeed
10000 0.526 4648 17889 17964 Succeed
12000 0.632 7680 29912 29514* Succeed
13000 0.684 – – – Succeed
18700 0.984 – – – Succeed
18800 0.989 – – – Fail
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